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THE REDSKINS’ TRADEMARK CONTROVERSY  
AND THE EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH PROVING 
DISPARAGEMENT UNDER SECTION 2(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT 
FRANK SICLARI 
I. Introduction 
This paper sets out to discuss the current controversy regarding the registration status of 
six federally registered trademarks registered to the Washington Redskins football team.  
Specifically, these marks have seen a series of two challenges raised by very similar petitioners 
who put forward a very similar record of evidence in an effort to show that the marks were 
disparaging, as defined in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, to a substantial composite of Native 
Americans when the marks were first registered.  
Currently, the Washington Redskins, represented by Pro-Football, Inc. (Pro-Football), are 
litigating the second of these disparagement claims before the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, where Pro-Football hopes to win an appeal of the cancellation order recently 
issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) reviewing agency, the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). This paper takes the position that Pro-Football will 
likely prevail because the record of evidence is insufficient to support a finding under the strict 
burden of proof applied under the recently passes America Invents Act (AIA). 
Although Pro-Football’s claim includes the defense of laches, and a host of constitutional 
challenges, the research herein solely reviews the disparagement claim and the evidentiary 
burden which makes it difficult for petitioners for cancellation to prevail after long periods of 
time have passed.  Furthermore, the research contained herein sets out to show that the most 
recent petitioners have pigeonholed themselves by refusing to supplement the record from the 
prior petition which ultimately failed. 
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II. Background of Trademark Law 
A. History and Basics 
A trademark is “any work, name, symbol, or device … used by a person … to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold to 
others and to indicate source of the goods, even if that source is unknown”.1  A service mark is 
“a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to identify the services of one person and 
distinguish them from the services of others”.2  Because both trademarks and service marks serve 
similar functions, they are both commonly referred to as trademarks.3 Accordingly, this paper 
will refer to both types of marks as trademarks. 
The Lanham Act creates a mechanism for trademark owners to obtain federal registration 
for their marks.  In order to obtain a trademark or a service mark registration in the United States, 
the mark owner must submit an application with the USPTO, which is required to refuse 
registration of applications that do not meet the registration criteria of 1 U.S.C. §1052.4   
If denied registration, the applicant may request reconsideration by appealing to the 
TTAB.5 The TTAB is a component of the USPTO, and consists of the Director of the USPTO, 
the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative judges 
appointed by the Director.6  As provided for in the Lanham Act, the TTAB sits in three-member 
panels to make its decisions.7  The Lanham Act also creates provides competitors and others with 
a process to request review of an examining attorney’s decision to issue a registration that they 
believe is contrary to 15 U.S.C. § 1052.  Accordingly, the TTAB reviews both oppositions and 
petitions to cancel registrations on behalf of the USPTO.8  
The Lanham Act, and more generally the trademark law, was drafted with the intention of 
affording protection to both the consumer and the owner of the mark from unfair competition 
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that results when a third-party infringer appropriates the mark for their own benefit.9  Trademark 
protection in the United States (U.S.) is granted to the first entity to use a particular mark in the 
geographic area where it operates, regardless of whether the mark is registered.  A claim for 
infringement is usually based on the likelihood of confusion and an argument that the alleged 
infringer has created some kind of unfair competition.10 Accordingly, trademarks serve several 
important global functions: to signify a product’s source; to signify that the same source controls 
the relevant goods; to signify a consistent level of quality with the goods bearing the trademark; 
to serve as an advertisement tool; and to serve as an objective symbol of the trademark holder’s 
goodwill.11  
B. Disparagement 
While trademark law sets out to protect the holder of the mark from unfair competition, it 
also affords protection to the interests of persons who can show the TTAB that they are harmed 
by the mark’s usage.  Specifically, the Lanham Act bars the registration of a mark which 
“[c]onsists of or compromises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may 
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or 
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”.12  
In order to prove “disparagement”, the TTAB takes a two-pronged approach.13  First, the 
board must determine the meaning of the relevant term, as it is used in connection with the 
products identified in the registration. To accomplish this end, the TTAB considers the 
dictionary definition of the term, the relationship of the term and other elements of the mark, the 
type of product upon which the mark appears, and how the mark will appear in the marketplace. 
Secondly, the board examines whether the meaning was disparaging to the referenced group.  
The latter prong of the test requires a “substantial composite” of the referenced group to find the 
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term disparaging. Furthermore, the petitioners must be able to show that the marks were 
offensive to a substantial composite of the referenced group at the time of registration.   
C. America Invents Act 
After being signed into law by President Barack Obama on September 16, 2011, the AIA 
of  2011 fundamentally changed the treatment of intellectual property by the USPTO.  Although 
the AIA most greatly affected the governance of patent registrations, most notably switching the 
U.S. patent system from a “first to invent” system to a “first inventor to file” system, it also 
provided for several changes to USPTO practices.  Relevant to the issues discussed herein, the 
AIA changed the venue for appeals from USPTO inter partes proceedings from the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
III. Background of the Redskins’ Controversy 
A. History and Basics 
On July 9, 1932, the city of Boston, Massachusetts was awarded its first franchise in the 
National Football League (NFL).  On October 2 of that same year, taking the namesake of the 
Major League Baseball (MLB) team with whom they shared a stadium, the Boston Braves took 
to the gridiron for their inaugural season under the ownership of Vincent Bendiz, Jay O’Brien, 
Dorlan Doyle, and George Preston Marshall.  However, after reporting a loss on the season, three 
of the owners decided to cut their losses and to leave the franchise in the sole ownership of 
George Preston Marshall, who controlled the franchise’s operations for the next six decades.  
Once in control of the franchise, Marshall, who previously enjoyed success in the 
laundromat business, began to make wholesale changes. Almost immediately, Marshall fired 
Head Coach Lud Wray after his middling 4-4-1 inaugural season to make way for the hiring of 
his next head coach, William Henry “Lone Star” Dietz.  In a marketing attempt to distance 
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himself from one of Boston’s professional baseball team’s also known as the Braves, Marshall 
relocated his franchise’s home stadium from Braves Field, home of the Braves baseball team, to 
Fenway Park, home of Boston’s other professional baseball team, the Red Sox.   
In taking no half measures, Marshall broke all ties with the baseball team with whom he 
formally shared a stadium by changing his team’s namesake from the “Braves” to the 
“Redskins”.   Marshall, a promotional wiz, made sure to thrust this name change into the 
spotlight.  For example, on July 6, 1933, the Boston Herald published an article announcing 
Marshall’s decision which explained the change as one “made to avoid confusion with the 
Braves baseball team and that the team is to be coached by an Indian, Lone Star Dietz, with 
several Indian players”.14  Next, on the first day of practice that year, Marshall’s coach and 
players posed for pictures dressed in headdresses and war paint.  Notably, Coach Dietz 
maintained a similar dress code for each of the team’s home games that season.  
After two disappointing seasons under Coach Dietz, partially owing to rule changes 
which promoted passing offenses, Marshall decided it was time for another change and replaced 
Dietz with a new head coach, and another the following year.  In 1937, struggling to find and 
maintain a fanbase, Marshall relocated his team to the Washington, D.C. area.  In 1966, just 
under thirty years, twelve head coaches, and two championships later, Marshall and the 
Redskins’ filed their first application to register the franchise’s namesake.  In 1967, the 
franchise’s application for federal registration of its service mark was accepted. By1990, the 
USPTO granted registrations to a total of six marks owned by Pro-Football, Inc. (hereinafter 
“Pro-Football”) which contained the word “Redskins” or a derivative of the word. 
B. Pro-Football, Inc.      
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Pro-Football, Inc. is the corporate owner of the Washington Redskins, a National Football 
League football team located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Pro-Football is the 
owner of the six marks at issue in the matter analyzed herein.15 
IV. Procedural History 
A. The Harjo Petition 
1. Harjo Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
On September 10, 1992, twenty-five years after the Redskins’ football team received its 
first federal registration, Suzan Shown Harjo and six other Native Americans [collectively, 
hereinafter the “Harjo Petitioners”] filed the first cancellation petition which challenged the 
Redskins’ organization’s namesake pursuant to Section 14 of the Trademark Act of 1946 
[hereinafter the “Harjo Petition”].16  
Specifically, the Harjo Petitioners challenged the six marks, supra, on grounds that the 
usage: 1) is “scandalous”; 2) “may… disparage” Native Americans; and 3) may cast Native 
Americans into “contempt or disrepute” in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1052(a).17 
In its answer, Pro-Football denied: 1) that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
unconstitutionally impinges on First Amendment speech rights; 2) that it also contravenes Fifth 
Amendment due process rights; and 3) that the Harjo Petitioner’s challenge was barred by the 
equitable defense of laches.18  However, in a pretrial order issued in March 1994, the TTAB 
struck each of Pro-Football’s defenses.19  The constitutional arguments were dismissed because, 
as the board explained, deciding on the constitutionality of a statute is beyond the scope of the 
board’s authority.20  The board also opined that the doctrine of laches was not available as a 
defense because the Harjo Petitioners advocated on behalf of a broad, public interest, while Pro-
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Football’s interests were distinctly private.21 Thus, the board decided the matter based on the 
claims which related to the Lanham Act.  
Five years later, in finding the record showed by “substantial evidence” that each relevant 
mark “may be disparaging of Native Americans to a substantial composite of this group of 
people” or “may bring Native Americans into contempt or disrepute,” the TTAB issued a 
cancellation order for Pro-Football’s six contested marks.22  
With respect to the review of the meaning of the language found in Section 2(a), the 
board determined that such issues pertain only to the time periods when the relevant registrations 
were issued.  The Harjo Board framed the issue before them as “whether, at the times [Pro-
Football] was issued each of its challenged registrations, [Pro-Football’s] registered marks 
consisted of or compromised scandalous matter, or matter which may disparage or bring Native 
Americans into contempt or disrepute”.23  
The Harjo Board’s analysis began with a discussion of “scandalous matter”, as defined in 
the relevant portion of Section 2(a).  After noting that the vast majority of the relevant reported 
cases involving the relevant portion of Section 2(a) were decided principally on the basis of 
whether the marks consisted of scandalous matter24, the board concluded that the registrations in 
the current matter did not comprise “scandalous matter”.25    
Next, the board discussed the meaning of “may…disparage”, which it recognized as a 
clear and distinct ground for refusing or cancelling the registration of a mark under Section 
2(a).26 On this term, the board admitted to having little precedent or legislative history for 
guidance in interpreting the disparagement provision and found the determination of whether 
matter may be disparaging to be “highly subjective”.27 As a result, the board chose to structure a 
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new two-pronged test for disparagement, as defined in Section 2(a).28 Under this new test, the 
board’s disparagement determination was depended on the following two inquiries: 
(1) What is the meaning of the matter in question, as it appears in the marks as 
used in connection with the goods and services identified in the registrations? 
(2) Is the meaning of the marks one that may disparage a substantial composite 
of Native Americans at the time of each mark’s registration?29 
Likewise, on the meaning of Section 2(a)“contempt or disrepute”, the board concluded that: 
The guidelines enunciated herin in connection with determining whether matter in 
a mark be disparaging are equally applicable to determining whether such matter 
brings ‘persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols into 
contempt or disrepute.’   
As consequence, a finding of disparagement necessitates a finding of “contempt or disrepute”.30   
On this conflated issue, the board was offered the following record of evidence: witness 
testimony, which discussed resolutions passed by their respective organizations,31; an American 
history expert testimony32; a multicultural counseling issues expert testimony33; a Native 
American educational issues expert; linguistic expert testimony from both parties; a film 
expert34; survey expert testimony from both parties; and marketing expert testimony from both 
parties.35   
After reviewing this record, the board made findings of fact which related to only two 
pieces of evidence, survey expert testimony and linguist expert testimony.36  
Dr. Ivan Ross, the Harjo Petitioners’ survey expert, testified that the relevant survey was 
conducted to “determine the perception of a substantial composite of the general population and 
of Native Americas to the word ‘redskin(s)’ as a reference to Native Americans”.37  In his effort 
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to obtain the necessary substantial composite, Dr. Ross surveyed three hundred and one (301) 
non-Native Americans and three hundred and fifty-eight (358) Native Americans.38 Dr. Ross 
testified that the Native American participants represented “a stratified sample” of the Native 
American population, “wherein census reports were used to identify the twenty states with the 
largest numbers of Native Americans, from which the Native American sample was chosen 
according to a random sample plan”.39    
 Dr. Ross’ telephone survey was conducted by asking the participants, in varying order, 
whether they found the following “terms offensive”:  “Native American”, “Buck”, “Brave”, 
“Redskin”, “Injun”, “Indian”, and “Squaw”.40 Participants were then asked whether they, or 
others would be “offended” by the use of term and, if so, why. 41 Notably, Dr. Ross testified that, 
for the question, he chose the word “offensive” as most likely to reflect, to those unfamiliar with 
trademark law, the behavior concepts embodied in the terms “scandalous” and “disparaging” in 
trademark law.42 
 Ultimately, Dr. Ross’ survey concluded that 46.2% of the general population sample 
would be personally offended by the use of the term “redskin”, while only 36.6% percent of the 
Native American population sample would be personally offended by the usage.43 
 Although Pro-Football did not conduct its own survey, it did provide the expert witness, 
Dr. Jacob Jacoby, to discuss the survey on the record. 44  In his expert testimony, among offering 
various other procedural concerns with the sample selection process, including a challenge that 
the survey represented only two percent of all U.S. counties and that Hawaii and Alaska were 
erroneously excluded,45 Dr. Jacoby challenged the validity of the survey for the following 
reasons: that the questions were leading and not neutral; the list contained an insufficient number 
of terms; that the term “offensive”  as used to mean “disparaging” failed to answer the relevant 
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question under section 2(a); and the Native American sample was too geographically limited to 
serve as representative.  
Ultimately, Dr. Jacoby concluded the survey was an “utter failure” because it did not 
ascertain the perceptions of the relevant population at the relevant time period, the time when the 
marks were first registered46, and because it failed to use the term “redskin(s)” in the context of 
Pro-Football’s entertainment services.47 
In accordance with Dr. Jacoby’s testimony, the Harjo Board conceded that the survey 
was “not without flaws,”48  As stated by the board: 
We agree with Dr. Jacoby that a survey of attitudes as of the dates of registration 
of the challenged registrations would have been extremely relevant in this case, if 
such a survey could be credibly constructed. But neither party chose to undertake 
such a survey.49 
However, despite finding “merit” behind Dr. Jacoby’s criticisms, the Harjo Board concluded that 
the record of evidence provided “ample support for the viability of the survey methodology used, 
including the sampling plan, the principal questions asked, and the manner in which the survey 
was conducted”.50   
 In making specific findings of fact based on the expert linguists’ testimony, the board 
mainly highlighted portions of the evidentiary record that were not disputed by the parties’ 
expert linguists.51 With respect to the dictionary evidence offered by both parties, the board 
found the contradictory opinions of the opposing parties to be of “little value” in resolving the 
dispute.52 Instead the board independently considered the dictionary definitions themselves as 
evidence which was relevant to the ultimate legal inquiry.53   
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Although the Harjo Board made no findings of fact regarding NCAI Resolution 93-11 or 
the depositions of the Executive Director of the NCAI, JoAnn Chase, and of the Director of 
Indian Legal Information Development Service (“ILDS”) Director, Harold Martin Gross, the 
Harjo Board opined that this evidence “reinforced” its prior disparagement determinations.54 
Ultimately, on April 2, 1999, the board issued a cancellation order for each of the six 
contested trademarks after finding that each relevant mark “may be disparaging of Native 
Americans to a substantial composite of this group of people” or “may bring Native Americans 
into contempt or disrepute”.55  On the remaining issue, the TTAB found the relevant marks to not 
be “scandalous”.56  
2. Harjo in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
On June 1, 1999, less than a month after the TTAB’s decision by the Harjo Board, Pro-
Football filed its first complaint with the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.57   In its complaint, Pro-Football sought de novo review and presented the court with 
five causes of actions supporting its request to overturn the cancellation order: 1) the trademarks 
do not disparage Native Americans; 2) the trademarks do not bring Native Americans into 
contempt or disrepute; 3) Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violates the First Amendment because 
it is a vague, overbroad, and content-based restriction on speech; 4) Section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act is unduly vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and 5) Defendant’s cancellation 
petition was barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.58  
On August 30, 1999, coinciding with their answer, the Harjo Petitioners filed a motion 
requesting the following relief: (1) to dismiss Pro-Football’s constitutional and laches claims; or, 
(2) in the alternative, for a judgment on the pleadings with regard to those claims.  However, 
after conducting a motions hearing and receiving additional briefs from both parties, the court 
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denied without prejudice the Harjo Petitioners’ motion with respect to both requests.59 The court 
opined that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance required the court to first rule on the three 
non-constitutional claims, and only address the constitutional claims should Pro-Football not 
prevail on its other claims first. 60   
With respect to the Harjo Petitioners’ motion to dismiss Pro-Football’s laches claim, the 
court found that “the Lanham Act does not unequivocally bar laches claims and defenses raised 
in regard to petitions brought under section 2(a)” and the applicability of the doctrine of laches is 
“dependent upon the equities of the factual scenarios within it is raised”.61  Therefore, as the 
court opined, Pro-Football’s laches claim should not be dismissed until the factual record could 
be further developed.62 
On July 12, 2003, after an extensive discovery period, the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment.   In its motion, Pro-Football sought summary judgment on its first, second, 
and fifth causes of action, arguing that Pro-Football’s trademarks in dispute do not disparage 
Native Americans, that the trademarks do not and will not bring Native Americans into contempt 
or disrepute, and, that the doctrine of laches applies.63 In their cross motion for summary 
judgment, the Harjo Petitioners argued that the court should affirm the TTAB’s decision, that 
Pro-Football’s laches claim should be rejected, and to dismiss Pro-Football’s constitutional 
claims, should the court reach that issue.64    
On September 30, 2003, the District Court for the District of Columbia granted Pro-
Football’s summary judgment motion and reversed the TTAB’s order to cancel the six registered 
trademarks in question for two reasons: 
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The TTAB’s finding of disparagement is not supported by substantial evidence 
and must be reversed. The decision should also be reversed because the doctrine 
of laches precludes consideration of the case.65 
However, before discussing any of its findings, the board discussed the appropriate standard of 
review.  On this point, the court found that “its review of the TTAB’s findings shall be 
commensurate with the ‘substantial evidence’ standard of review articulated in the APA”.66  
Under the substantial evidence standard, the court will reverse the TTAB’s findings of fact if 
they are “unsupported by substantial evidence” or “more than a mere scintilla”.67  
In its analysis, the court criticized the limited factual findings of the TTAB and the great 
deal of summarization which the Harjo Board undertook instead. As explained by the court, 
“[e]ven though it spent fourteen pages cataloging the evidence in the case, the TTAB made 
findings of fact in only two areas: 1) linguists testimony and (2) survey evidence”.68  
With respect to the entire record of linguists’ testimony, the TTAB made only five 
findings of fact recognizable to the district court.69 As the court pointed out, the TTAB still failed 
to “make any findings of fact with regard to the usage labels contained in the some dictionary 
definitions” and “simply considered the dictionary definitions, themselves, in the context of its 
legal analysis, without relying on the experts’ opinions”.70  
With respect to the survey evidence, the court found that the Harjo Board made three 
findings of fact. 71  With respect to these findings, the court found substantial evidence in support 
of the TTAB’s “narrow” conclusion that the evidence represented nothing more than “a survey 
of current attitudes at the time the survey was conducted”.  However, the court found that the 
record lacked substantial evidence to support the Harjo Board’s findings that the methodology 
was proper to extrapolate the survey results to the Native American population at large; thus, it 
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so followed, that the record also lacked substantial evidence to show that the survey represented 
the views of the two populations sampled.72 
 In response to the board’s attempt to “reinforce” it’s conclusions with unsubstantiated 
resolutions and deposition testimony, the court explained: 
To corroborate its ultimate conclusion, the TTAB cites to other evidence which 
this Court views as irrelevant because it has no correlation to the relevant time 
frame at issue and it does not add exponentially to the requirement that the marks, 
when used in connection with Pro-Football's services, are considered disparaging 
by a substantial composite of Native Americans. The TTAB noted that the record 
includes Resolutions indicating a present objection to the use of the word 
"redskin(s)" in connection with Pro-Football's services, from the National 
Congress of American Indians ("NCAI"), "a broad-based organization of Native 
American tribes and individuals" from the Oneida tribe, and from Unity 94, "an 
organization including Native Americans." All of these resolutions were made 
after the relevant time frame, with no explanation by the TTAB as to how they 
‘shed light’ on the relevant time period, and thus, are irrelevant to the calculus ... 
Moreover, the TTAB made no findings of fact about the strength of this evidence.  
Ultimately, the court rejected the board’s finding of disparagement because “the TTAB’s finding 
that the marks at issue ‘may disparage’ Native Americans is unsupported by substantial 
evidence, is logically flawed, and fails to apply the correct legal standard to its own finding of 
fact”. 73  
Notably, the court also concluded, “in the alternative,” that the doctrine of laches barred 
the Harjo Petitions claims because “the record demonstrates both undue delay and economic 
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prejudice.”74 Specifically, the board articulates the availability of laches only when the following 
three-pronged test is satisfied: 
1) the Native Americans delayed substantially before commencing their challenge 
to the “redskins” trademarks; 
2) the Native Americans were aware of the trademarks during the period of delay; 
and  
3) Pro-Football’s ongoing development of goodwill during the period of delay 
engendered a reliance interest in the preservation of the trademarks”.75  
Before answering each of the three prongs affirmatively, the court also denied the Harjo 
Petitioners’ argument that laches was barred by section 2(a) where a “public interest” is 
vindicated.76  Instead, the court refused to interpret the Lanham Act to preclude laches and 
opined that the affirmative defense of laches in this case, like all laches claims, must be decided 
on its specific facts and circumstances.77  
The Harjo Petitioners appealed the court rulings that the claim of disparagement was not 
supported by substantial evidence and that the defense of laches may be asserted against a 
disparagement claim to the D.C. Circuit Court, who found that the district court applied the 
wrong standard in evaluating laches with respect to one petitioner.78  Accordingly, the DC 
Circuit ruled in favor of the Harjo Petitioners and remanded the matter to the district court to 
decide the narrow issue of whether laches barred the one petitioner’s claim.79 
Specifically, the DC Circuit found that because the equitable doctrine of laches cannot 
begin to run before a party has reached the age of majority “the district court mistakenly started 
the clock for assessing laches in 1967 – the time of the first mark’s registration – for all 
appellants, even though the first Native American was at that time only one year old.”.80  
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Therefore, in remanding the matter to the district court, the appellate court ruled that “[t]he 
district court should have measured both the first Native American’s delay and the resulting 
prejudice[both economic and trial] to the owner based on the period between his attainment of 
majority and the filing of the 1992 cancellation petition”.81 The D.C. Circuit did not address the 
issue of whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of disparagement.  
On June 25, 2008, the court granted Pro-Football summary judgment on the sole issue of 
whether the claims brought by the one petitioner, who was born in 1966, was barred by laches.82  
After finding that “[the one petitioner] unreasonably delayed his bringing of a cancellation 
petition and that his eight year delay demonstrates a lack of diligence on his part”, the court also 
found that “the delay … resulted in prejudice to Pro-Football, such that it would be inequitable to 
allow [the one petitioner] to proceed with his cancellation petition”.83 
Once again, the Harjo Petitioners appealed the district court’s decision to the D.C. 
Circuit.  However, in light of the narrow inquiry of the district court on remand, the Harjo 
Petitioners argued “only that the district court improperly assessed evidence of prejudice in 
applying laches to the facts at issue”.84 On May 15, 2009, after reviewing the record, the D.C. 
Circuit found no error and affirmed the decision of the lower court on the issue of laches and 
stated that the petitioners “argue only that the District Court improperly assessed evidence of 
prejudice in applying laches to the facts at issue” and limited its decision “to that question.”85 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit resolved the case solely on the issue of laches, never addressing the 
Board’s finding of disparagement on the merits. 
On November 16, 2009, the Harjo Petition failed for the last time when the Unites States 
Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari. 
B. The Blackhorse Petition 
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In August 2006, while the decision in Harjo was still pending, Amanda Blackhorse and 
four other, new Native Americans (collectively, hereinafter the “Blackhorse Petitioners”) filed a 
petition to cancel the same six registrations that were challenged in the Harjo Petition.86  Like the 
Harjo Petitioners before them, the Blackhorse Petitioners argued “that the registrations were 
obtained contrary to Section 2(a), which prohibits registration of marks that may disparage 
persons or bring them into contempt or disrepute”.87 However, unlike the Harjo Petitioners, the 
petitioners here were not yet born when the marks were originally registered. 
1. Blackhorse Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
On June 19, 2014, after the proceedings in this matter were suspended pending the 
disposition of the Harjo action, a split TTAB ordered the cancelation of six trademarks owned by 
the Redskins organization after concluding that the marks “were disparaging to Native 
Americans at the respective times they were registered, in violation of Section 2(a) of the 
Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1052(a)”.88  The majority of the board also concluded, as the 
board did in deciding on the Harjo petition, that the Blackhorse Petitioners’ claim was not barred 
by the doctrine of laches.    
To determine the disparagement claim at issue, the TTAB reiterated appropriateness of 
the two-pronged analysis articulated by the Harjo Board and upheld in the District Court’s 
review of that decision.89 However, under the AIA, the Blackhorse Board’s review requires the 
more strict “preponderance of the evidence” review.90 
 In light of this higher burden of proof, the parties the parties stipulated, with limited 
exceptions, that the entire record of evidence used by the Harjo Board may be submitted into 
evidence through a Notice of Reliance.91 In a pertinent part, the stipulation provided that “all 
evidence submitted with a Notice of Reliance, as well as all deposition transcripts and exhibits 
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thereto submitted by any party, in Harjo … shall be admissible in this proceeding unless the 
[TTAB] ruled in Harjo that the evidence was not admissible, in  which case all arguments as to 
admissibility are preserved”.92 Thus, as stipulated, the parties only reserved the right to make 
objections based on the relevance of evidence admitted in the Harjo record and this case.93 
Because it rejected the Harjo Petitioners’ survey evidence, the board, in deciding the 
second prong, was forced to look to other available evidence which most directly reflected the 
sentiments of Native Americans. As such, for the general analysis of the word, the board 
reviewed and discussed the testimony and reports provided by the parties’ respective experts, 
dictionary definitions, and reference books.94  For the specific views of Native Americans, the 
board focused on the National Congress of American Indians’ 1993 Resolution 93-11, the 
deposition of NCAI Executive Director, Ms. JoAnn Chase, the deposition of Dr. Harold Martin 
Gross, and various newspaper articles, reports, official records, and letters.95.  
After a review of the same record presented to the Harjo Board, the board in this matter 
concluded that the record was more than substantial on the follow basis: (1) “NCAI Resolution 
93-11 represents the views of a substantial composite of Native Americans”96; (2) “[t]he trend in 
dictionary usage labels corroborates the time frame of the objections from Native Americans 
starting in the sixties and continuing through the nineties as lexicographers begin [to] uniformly 
label the term as ‘offensive’ or ‘disparaging’”97; (3) “[the disparagement] is also demonstrated 
by the near complete drop-off in usage of ‘redskins’ as a reference to Native Americans 
beginning in the 1960’s”98; and (4) “[t]he record establishes that, at minimum, approximately 
thirty percent of Native Americans found the term REDSKINS used in connection with 
respondent’s services to be disparaging at all times including 1967, 1972, 1974, 1978, and 
1990”99. 
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2. Blackhorse Before the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
On August 8, 2014, Pro-Football filed a Complaint against Defendants before the court 
seeking de novo judicial review of the Blackhorse TTAB’s decision to order the cancellation of 
six federally registered marks.  Specifically, the Complaint raised the following seven causes of 
action: (1) Declaration of Non-Disparagement; (2) Declaration of Non-Contempt or Disrepute; 
Declaration that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act Violates the First Amendment; (3) Declaration 
that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is Void for Vagueness; (5) Declaration that the TTAB Order 
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (6) Declaration that the TTAB Order 
Violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (7) Declaration that Defendant’s 
Petition was Barred by the Doctrine of Laches.100    
On September 22, 2014 the Blackhorse Petitioners responded with a motion for summary 
judgment in which they alleged that there was “no justiciable dispute” because the Blackhorse 
Petitioners have no direct stake in the outcome of the case. In accordance with this allegation, the 
Blackhorse Petitioners further alleged that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because 
the Blackhorse Petitioners are not “parties in interest”.101  
On November 25, 2014, the court handed down its decision to deny the Harjo Petitioners’ 
Motion. In his Memorandum Opinion, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee provided four main reasons: (1) 
the legitimate interests of the parties in the cancellation of the mark are sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution; (2) §1071(b) of the Lanham Act provides 
review of a TTAB’s decision in the Federal Circuit or a United States District Court, and the 
alleged harm or controversies decided in such administrative proceeding must carry over into the 
review of the proceeding; (3) the Harjo Petitioners’ cancellation petition demonstrated that they 
have a sufficient interest in the registration to constitute §1071 “adverse parties” and “parties in 
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interest”; and, most significant to the analysis here, (4) the prior proceeding before the TTAB 
was an inter partes proceeding where the Harjo Petitioners were the sole adverse parties.102 
IV. Analysis of the Section 2(a) Disparagement Claim Currently Before the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
  Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark “which may disparage 
… persons ... or bring them into contempt, or disrepute”.103  As originally decided by the board 
in Harjo, the guidelines for determining whether the marks were disparaging are equally 
applicable to determine whether such matter brings persons or institutions into contempt or 
disrepute.104  Since Pro-Football did not raise the board’s conflation of the inquiries as an issue 
on appeal to the court, the Harjo Court refused to consider the determination altogether.105  
Instead, the District Court in Harjo only reviewed “whether the marks at issue “may disparage” 
Native Americans, which then included whether the marks bring Native Americans into 
contempt or disrepute. 106 Likewise, after the board applied this same conflated analysis in the 
Blackhorse matter, Pro-Football did not raise the conflation as an issue before the court.107  Thus, 
the court will likely apply the analysis articulated first by the board in Harjo and subsequently 
applied at each stage of the Harjo and Blackhorse matters where disparagement was at issue. 
However, since the parties in this matter agreed that the term “redskins” clearly refers to both the 
professional football team while retaining an allusion to Native Americans, the disparagement 
inquiry before the court will likely be limited to the second prong of the disparagement test: 
whether the meaning of the marks, as used in the context of Pro-Football’s services, is one that 
may disparage Native Americans at the time of each mark’s registration.  108  
With respect to the second prong, finding of a “substantial composite” of the referenced 
group is a fact to be determined at trial.109 Significantly, the AIA heightened the burden of proof 
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since the Harjo Petition was resolved.  In the current matter before the court, the court cannot 
make any findings of fact which are not supported by a “preponderance of the evidence” on the 
record, as opposed to the “substantial evidence” or “more than a mere scintilla” which was 
appropriate under the APA in the Harjo proceedings. In order to make a determination that the 
evidence satisfies the more burdensome preponderance of the evidence standard, the court will 
be “charged with taking into account the views of the entire referenced group who may 
encounter [Pro-Football’s services] in any ordinary course of trade for the identified goods and 
services”110  
In the underlying action, the Blackhorse Board answered the second prong affirmatively. 
However, because the record does not substantiate its finding, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that a substantial composite of Native Americans found the marks disparaging at the 
time of each registration, the court should find for Pro-Football on the disparagement issue and 
reverse the TTAB’s order to cancel the six marks.111  
A. The Record is Insufficient  to Find, by a Preponderance of the Evidence, that a 
Substantial Composite of Native Americans at Any Point During the Relevant Time Period 
of 1966-1990 Found the Marks as Used in the Context of Pro-Football’s Services to be 
Disparaging.    
Through a joint notice of reliance, Pro-Football and the Blackhorse Petitioners stipulated 
that nearly the entire record of evidence offered in the Harjo proceedings – evidence which the 
District Court for the District of Columbia and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals already found 
insufficient to support the exact same claim – would be admitted into evidence for the board’s 
review.112 The only evidence from the Harjo record that was not stipulated into this record was 
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the deposition testimony of the Harjo Petitioners.113  This excluded evidence was, in effect, 
substituted out for the deposition testimony of the Blackhorse Petitioners.114   
In an attempt to substantiate its conclusion that a substantial composite of Native 
Americans who found the term disparaging not only existed at the relevant time but can be 
substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence on the record, the Blackhorse TTAB made 
thirty-nine findings of fact.115  All of these facts were based on two categories of evidence: 1) a 
general analysis of the word “redskins”; and 2) the specific views of some individuals in the 
referenced group.116   
1. Evidence Related to the General Analysis of the Word “Redskins” 
With respect to the general analysis of the term “redskins”, the board leaned heavily on 
the dictionary research conducted by the Blackhorse Petitioner’s expert linguist, Mr. Barnhart.117  
In a pertinent part, Mr. Barnhart’s testimony indicated that dictionaries did not include a 
restrictive usage label for the term “redskin” until a single dictionary chose to in 1966.118 While 
the record does not include a copy of that dictionary, it does include excerpts from twenty-eight 
other dictionaries published throughout the relevant time period.119  Of these twenty-eight 
dictionaries, ten editors reported the term as “standard English”, while only two editors identified 
the same term as “disparaging”.120  
After failing to explain its decision to ignore the twenty-six of twenty-eight dictionaries 
made available on the record which do not refer to the term “redskin” as “disparaging”, the 
Blackhorse board found it appropriate to base its finding that the usage labels found in two of the 
twenty-eight dictionaries on the record “show[s] a clear trend beginning in 1966 to label this 
term as offensive.”121 However the majority of the board’s concept of a “clear trend’ consists of 
two dictionaries. As stated by the Blackhorse dissent, “[t]wo does not make a trend.”122 
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Regardless of whether it actually does, the majority of the board’s failure to provide an 
explanation not to draw findings from the first twenty-six dictionaries necessitates a finding that 
the majority’s findings fell short of satisfying the appropriate standard of proof.     
Likewise, the Blackhorse Board applied flawed reasoning when it found significance in 
the testimony offered by the Blackhorse Petitioners’ expert witnesses, Dr. Geoffrey Nunberg, 
which pointed to a decrease in usage for the term “redskins” among media outlets after 1970.123 
Although Pro-Football offered a valid criticism that such indirect thinking lacks scientific basis, 
the board contended that “[it did] not rely on Dr. Nunberg’s ultimate opinions and conclusions 
… rather [the board looked] to the underlying data that is not in dispute which undeniably shows 
a drop-off in usage”. While it is true that Mr. Barnhart’s research reached a similar conclusion, 
this correlation does not necessitate the causation the Blackhorse Board attaches to it. In fact, the 
record provides no basis, scientific or otherwise, which suggests a connection between the drop 
in usage of the term and the meaning of the marks in the context of Pro-Football’s services.124  
Therefore, once again, the majorities failure to explain the articulate any type of soundness in its 
judgment necessitates a finding that the majority’s findings fell short of satisfying the 
appropriate standard of proof.     
Moreover, the entirety of evidence which speaks to the general analysis of the word is 
irrelevant to the disparagement question left at issue.  Simply put, the dictionary evidence found 
in the record is insufficient to satisfy the test for disparagement because it fails to provide insight 
into the disparagement question at issue.  The relevant question is not whether the term 
“redskins” is generally offensive, or even whether the term is generally disparaging.  Rather, the 
appropriate legal question to be answered is whether the term as used in the marks in the context 
of Pro-Football’s services is disparaging.125 To use the dictionary evidence made available on the 
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record to support of finding of disparagement would be to ignore the high-hurdle set by the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Accordingly, the court should afford much more 
deference to evidence which pertains to how Native Americans perceived the term “redskins” 
when used in connection with the name of a football team.   
2. Evidence Related to the Native American Perception of the Marks as Used in the Context 
of Pro-Football’s Services  
Instead of consulting the entirety of the record’s evidence pertaining to the perceptions 
Native Americans at the relevant times, as required under both substantial evidence review and 
preponderance of the evidence review, the majority of the board only extrapolated on evidence 
that supported its findings.  As such, the majority of the Blackhorse Board found NCAI 
Resolution 93-11 to be “clearly probative” of the view of Native Americans held at the relevant 
time period because the NCAI “represented approximately thirty percent of Native Americans” 
and the resolution represents “a substantial composite” of Native Americans.”126  However, 
outside an unsubstantiated claim offered within the resolution at issue that the “NCAI is the 
oldest and largest intertribal organization nationwide”, the Blackhorse Petitioners have failed to 
offer any reliable evidence which attested to either the NCAI”s members during the relevant time 
period or who attended the meeting in which Resolution 93-11 was voted on and passed.127 
In an attempt to authenticate this resolution, the board was forced to supplement its 
findings with the deposition testimony of the Executive Director of the NCAI, JoAnn Chase, and 
of the Director of Indian Legal Information Development Service (“ILDS”) Director, Harold 
Martin Gross.  Ms. Chase, who became Executive Director in 1994, testified that approximately 
150 tribes were represented by the NCAI when the Resolution was passed in 1993.128 However, 
Ms. Chase also testified that she was not in attendance at the meeting when the resolution was 
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passed and that she neither knew whether any minutes of the meeting were taken nor where to 
locate any record of the minute.  Alarmingly, Ms. Chase also testified that she unaware of any 
indication that the necessary quorum of members was present for the vote.  When asked about 
the NCAI’s membership status throughout the relevant time period of 1967-1990, Ms. Chase 
testified that she did “not know what the membership of the organization at that time”.  
Despite the absence of the evidence which could put this approximate number of 
members into any sort of meaningful context for that year, such as evidence that would make it 
possible to calculate the percentage of the Native American population which the NCAI 
purported to represented, the majority of the Blackhorse Board chose to derive the percentage of 
Native Americans represented by the NCAI from Ms. Chase’s approximation of 150 member 
tribes in 1993 and the list of federally recognized Native American tribes which was published 
for the year 1995.129  Again, because of the multitude of unexplained leaps in its findings, the 
board’s analysis failed to satisfy the appropriate standard of review.  
First, leaving aside the relevance of the number and percentage of tribes the NCAI 
represented in 1993, the board’s decision to derive this percentage of representation from a list of 
federally recognized tribes for a different year altogether, without offering any support for its 
mathematical premise, fails to satisfy even the “substantial evidence” standard, let alone the 
necessary “preponderance of the evidence” standard.  Simply stated, the board inexplicably 
found it proper to compare the number of tribes the NCAI purported to have represented in 1993 
to a list of recognized tribes for the year 1995 when the list of recognized tribes for the year 1993 
was just as readily available to the petitioners. Thus, without providing any explanation for why 
this obviously inaccurate and illogical calculation would provide the board with a preponderance 
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of the evidence to rest the remainder of its findings on, the entire line of findings which follow 
this unsubstantiated conclusion should also be deemed insufficient by the court.130  
Still, the Blackhorse Board made further errors worthy of note.  For example, the board 
divided its approximation of 500 recognized tribes in 1995 by Ms. Chase’s approximated 150 
tribes which the NCAI purported to represent in 1993 to deduce a finding that the NCAI 
represented “approximately thirty-percent” or “one-third” of the Native American population.131 
Even after setting aside the fact one-third and thirty-percent are not interchangeable numbers, the 
board failed to explain why it approximated the “500” recognized tribes in the first place. A brief 
reading of the six pages from the 1995 Federal Register, would teach anyone with rudimentary 
mathematical skills that there were 540 federally recognized tribes in 1995.132 Even assuming 
that Ms. Chase’s representation of 150 tribes is fair and accurate and that the mathemat ical 
process applied by the board to obtain the percentage of representation is logically sound, the 
percentage of representation held by the NCAI would stall fall below twenty-eight percent. 
Regardless of whether any portion of that percentage can represent a substantial composite of the 
referenced population and whether any of the percentages can be sufficiently translated to the 
relevant time period, the board’s failure to explain the basis for any of its loose and 
approximated mathematics causes it to fail the preponderance of evidence standard immediately.  
In a second attempt to substantiate the validity of the NCAI’s  claims regarding the 
relevant time period, the Blackhorse Board majority turned on the deposition testimony of Mr. 
Gross.  The majority of the board found relevance in Mr. Gross’ testimony that Leon Cook, 
President of the NCAI, participated in a 1972 meeting with Edward Bennett Williams, then 
President and part-owner of the Washington Redskins, to discuss Mr. Williams’ team namesake.  
Instead of deposing Mr. Cook to have him testify regarding NCAI membership in 1972, the 
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Blackhorse Petitioners only offered a newspaper article which discussed the meeting and claimed 
that the NCAI retained 300,000 members at that time.133 However, as pointed out by the 
Blackhorse dissent, this article does not state that Mr. Cook or any other source provided this 
membership figure or even whether they spoke with the reporter at all.134 As a result, reliance on 
this evidence to corroborate the findings of NCAI 93-11, is speculative at best and surely does 
not offer the court a “preponderance of evidence”, nor even “scintilla” which these findings can 
be supported with.  
Ultimately, a careful examination of the evidence available on the record fails to show by 
a preponderance of the evidence that a substantial composite of Native Americans found the term 
to be disparaging in connection with Pro-Football’s services during the relevant time period of 
1967-1990.  As a necessary consequence of the deficiencies described above, the findings related 
to NCAI Resolution 93-11 should be rejected by the court.   
Although the board repeatedly chose not to expand on the evidence which placed term in 
the proper context, the record does include evidence that reach this relevant point. For example, 
the record contains evidence that at least two Native American groups use the term “Redskin” as 
the name of their sports teams: 
1) A sign at a Navajo Indian Reservation school: Red Mesa High School Home of 
the Redskins, with the photograph taken in 1989 and sent by Robert D. Kahn to 
Jack Kent Cooke on November 4, 1991; and 
2) A sports article in the April 30, 2010 issue of the Seminole Tribune (Fla.), 
referencing the “Lady Redskins” as one of the teams involved in a tribal 
basketball tournament.135 
Siclari 28 
 
Although the article was published after the relevant time period, it retains relevance because, 
like Navajo High School’s sign, it displays a positive perception within the Native American 
population of the term “redskin” when used in the context of a sports team. Collectively, this 
evidence could provide the court with the necessary preponderance of evidence to conclude that 
the term “redskins” when used as the name of a sports team takes on a different meaning than the 
one warned about in the general usage labels used by the board in Blackhorse to condemn Pro-
Football’s registrations.  
Should the evidence of the term’s usage by these Native American sports teams not 
satisfy the court alone, the record also contains nine other letters and articles which display the 
sentiments of Native American populations who have not found the term’s usage disparaging in 
the context sports’ teams which are not predominantly consisting of Native Americans.136  For 
example, a 1992 article in which the chief of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma sent a letter to the 
Washington Redskins organization which discussed the history of the Choctaws and how that 
history correlates with the usage of American Indian names and images by sports teams.  In his 
letter, Chief Roberts stated that:  
Sports teams traditionally adopt a namesake and image which they perceive as 
noble and powerful.  The Washington Redskins is a team … that Indian people 
can be proud to be identified with.137 
In light of the evidence available on the record to put the term “redskins” into a relevant context, 
the board’s decision, to value the testimony of Mr. Barnhart, a man who is neither Native 
American nor tasked with collecting the views of Native Americans, over such evidence, cannot 
be reasonably expected to clear the high-hurdle set by the preponderance of evidence standard.138 
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Furthermore, the Blackhorse Board’s decision to not offer any deference to the evidence 
in support of Pro-Football’s position because “it does not negate the opinions of those who find it 
disparaging”, fails to satisfy the less stringent “preponderance of the evidence” standard.  As 
explained by the court in its review of the Harjo TTAB’s decision, the preponderance of the 
evidence standard “involves examination of the record as a whole, taking into account evidence 
that both justifies and detracts from an agency’s decision”.139  
Thus, a review of the record reveals cognizable difference between the evidence used to 
substantiate the Blackhorse TTAB’s conclusions and the empirical evidence regarding how 
Native Americans perceive the use of the term as the name of a sports team: the latter answers 
the question raised in the second prong of the disparagement test with a definitive no, while the 
former fails to even address the relevant issues.  
B. Poorly Applied Precedent 
1. “Different” Meanings and “Stripped” Meanings  
In reviewing disparagement in the context of Pro-Football’s goods and services, the 
Blackhorse TTAB found it necessary to determine “what type of disparagement case the facts of 
this limited case present.”140 In doing so, the Blackhorse TTAB limited itself to three potential 
outcomes. According to the Blackhorse TTAB, such a context can: (1) turn an innocuous term 
into a disparaging one; (2)strip the disparaging meaning from  an otherwise disparaging term; or 
(3) have no effect on a term’s disparaging meaning.  In finding that the term at issue here fails to 
“strip the disparaging meaning from an otherwise disparaging term,” the board inappropriately 
compared the facts of this case to those of from the Squaw Valley and Heeb matters.   
In the matter of In re Squaw Valley Development Company, the TTAB was tasked with 
reviewing its previous decision to reverse the USPTO’s refusal to register marks containing the 
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word “squaw.”  Ultimately, the Squaw Valley TTAB affirmed its previous decision to register the 
marks “Squaw” and “Squaw One” as they related to ski-related goods but reversed, and rejected, 
the registrations as they related to non-ski-related goods and services.  In a relevant section 
which was cited by the Blackhorse TTAB, the Squaw Valley TTAB stated the following: 
the meaning of [‘Squaw’] and [‘Squaw One’], when used in connection with 
applicant's International Class 28 skiing-related goods, is applicant's Squaw 
Valley ski resort, and, when used in connection with the International Class 25 
goods and the International Class 35 services, is ‘not applicant or its ski resort, but 
rather . . . the dictionary definition of [‘Squaw’], i.e., an American Indian woman 
or wife.’ 
In the Blackhorse TTAB’s decision to cancel the six marks at issue, the board cited this section 
as proof that a term used in the context of goods or services can “strip the disparaging meaning 
from an otherwise disparaging term.” but that is not remotely close to the finding articulated by 
the Squaw Valley board.  In Squaw Valley, the board found that the ski-related goods referenced 
a geographic area, not Native Americans.141  Accordingly, the Squaw Valley Board did not imply 
that the acceptable usage “stripped” the term of its meaning, the board explicitly stated that this 
usage derived from a different term altogether, the geographic area.  For the Blackhorse Board to 
argue otherwise, it necessarily must be allowing the outside biases and preconceived notions of 
the decisionmaker to impact the final determination over the evidence made available on the 
record.  In effect, the Blackhorse Board’s inability to view the record through an object lens, 
created an irrebutable presumption of disparagement.  
 In re Heeb Media concerned an application to register a mark containing the word 
“Heeb” for use on clothing. Ultimately, despite the clearly disparate generational views among 
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the Jewish community, the Heeb Board found the mark disparaging.142  The Blackhorse Board 
used this case to exemplify when a term’s usage has “no effect on the term’s disparaging 
meaning”.  However, through the Blackhorse Board’s own admission, the cited section does not 
support such a conclusion.  In the Blackhorse Board’s own words, “[Heeb Media’s] good intent 
and inoffensive goods and services to not obviate findings that [the term] is disparaging in 
context of the goods and services.”143 This articulation does not shed light on when a mark has 
“no effect on term’s disparaging meaning”.  Instead, it simply offers the Heeb Board’s opinion 
that the intent of the usage is neither dispositive nor obsolete. Although a careful reading of this 
citation may have forced the Blackhorse Board to consider Pro-Football’s intent, which it did 
not, it does not speak on when or how a board should determine that the mark’s usage has “no 
effect on the term’s disparaging meaning”.  Thus, it does not offer anything of value when 
determining the “type of disparagement case”.  
2. “Ex Parte” Proceedings and “Inter Partes” Proceedings 
Further, for Blackhorse Board’s reliance on the Squaw Valley and Heeb matters ignores 
the different standards of proof required in ex parte and inter partes proceedings.144 Both the 
Squaw Valley and Heeb proceedings were ex parte proceedings.  In other words, both of those 
matters were initiated by petitioners who did not play an active role in the proceedings and left 
the dispute to be litigated between the mark holder and the USPTO.  On the other hand, an inter 
partes proceeding is an adversarial action between parties in which the petitioner remains an 
active participant in the proceedings.  Thus, in accordance with the findings of the court, the 
Blackhorse matter is an inter partes proceeding.145  
In recognition of the less stringent burden which controls the outcome of an ex parte 
proceeding, the Squaw Valley Board explained: 
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In ex parte prosecution, the burden is initially on the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) to put forth sufficient evidence that the mark for which registration is 
sought meets the above criteria of unregistrability. Mindful that the PTO has 
limited facilities for acquiring evidence – it cannot, for example, be expected to 
conduct a survey of the marketplace or obtain consumer affidavits – we conclude 
that the evidence of record here is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
deceptiveness.146   
However, unlike the PTO in an ex parte proceeding, the Blackhorse Petitioners in this 
proceeding do not have such “limited facilities for acquiring evidence”.  As a result, the 
Blackhorse Petitioners can be expected to “conduct a survey or obtain affidavits”.  
The Blackhorse Petitioners’ failure to produce such evidence was strictly the result of 
their own decisionmaking. Instead of preparer their own evidence, the Blackhorse Petitioners 
opted not to. 
Similar to the concerns raised by the board in Squaw Valley regarding the appropriate 
standard of proof in ex parte proceedings, the Heeb Board recognized the need to “be cognizant 
of the USPTO’s limitations in amassing evidence”.147  This lesser burden allowed the Heeb 
Board to rely upon a quote from Ken Jacobson, in which he stated that he was the associate 
national director of the Anti-Defamation League and that the word “heeb” “is offensive to many 
Jews”, without finding any evidence on the record that related to the authority of said Anti-
Defamation League, the authority of Jacobson to speak on behalf of the Jewish community, or 
the number of Jewish persons he claimed to represent.  Thus, as applied by the board in Heeb, a 
substantial composite of the referenced group may be deduced from the statements of a few 
individuals who proclaimed themselves to be group representatives without requiring the TTAB 
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to examine the representative capacity of those individuals or requiring any mathematical 
calculation concerning the number of referenced persons these individuals purported to 
represent.  
C. Since the Evidence Offered from the Blackhorse Petitioners is Essentially Unchanged 
from the Record of Evidence in the Harjo Proceedings and Because the Harjo Petitioner’s 
Same Claim Failed Under a Lesser Burden of Proof, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia’s Findings Should Stay Consistent with the Findings of the District 
Court for the District of Columbia. 
Not only is the claim currently before the Blackhorse Court the same claim that was 
raised in the Harjo cancellation proceeding, but the new petitioners also decided to submit 
essentially the same record of evidence as well.148 Despite the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
refusal to overturn the district court’s ruling in the Harjo proceeding that the evidence on the 
record was insufficient to support the Board’s finding of disparagement with substantial 
evidence, the only evidence from the Harjo record that was not stipulated into this record was 
the deposition testimony of the NUMBER Harjo Petitioners; however, the evidence was 
effectively replaced with the deposition testimony of the NUMBER Blackhorse Petitioners.149 As 
a consequence of the Blackhorse Petitioners’ failure to offer any evidence besides what was 
deemed insufficient to support the same claim in the Harjo matter, the evidence before in this 
case remains insufficient as well.  
 This conclusion would already hold true if the court was tasked with finding a mere 
“substantial composite” of the evidence, as the district court in Harjo was.  However, because of 
a new governing statute, the court must be able to support the new cancellation petition by a 
preponderance of the evidence. As such, the Blackhorse Board applies inconceivable logic 
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Thus, it is illogical for the Blackhorse Board to assume that an account of the evidence 
that so plainly failed the less strict burden of substantial evidence review could satisfy the stricter 
burden of proof required preponderance of the evidence standard.  
D. Err in Favor of Registration 
Lastly, the Blackhorse TTAB recognized that any cancellation of a registration should be granted 
only with “due caution” and “after a most careful study of all the facts.”150  In the case at bar, 
there isn’t just a doubt but a ruling on the same evidence and the same claim from another 
district.  Surely, a potential circuit split gives rise to a “doubt”.  In accordance with this need for 
“due caution” the court should not affirm the finding of the Blackhorse Board until, unlike that 
reviewing agency, the court has provided all of the evidence on the record the review it deserves.  
VI. Conclusion  
Proving disparagement as it pertains to Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is no easy task. 
Recent legislations, such as the America Invents Act, has only made it harder for petitioners to 
prevail on such claims by placing a higher evidentiary burden on those parties to show 
disparagement.  
In relation to the Blackhorse matter, it is very likely that Pro-Football will succeed in 
obtaining a reversal of the TTAB’s cancellation order because the record of evidence is 
insufficient made available by the Blackhorse Petitioners to support a finding under the strict 
burden of proof applied under the recently passed America Invents Act (AIA). 
 This is not to say that another group of petitioners could not win a similar claim in the 
future. Although this hypothetical challenger would be faced with more challenges, such as the 
passing of even more time, it seems clear from the controversy that has already transpired that 
they would be best off providing a review board, or a court, with a new record of evidence. 
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